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CLIOMETRICS 
A New Methodology for the History of Economic 
Thought 
Herrade Igersheim & Charlotte Le Chapelain ∗ 
Abstract: Our article aims to stress that historical approach 
can contribute to address issues faced by modern economic 
theory. So as to show the relevance of historical analysis in 
economics, we first state the “methodology” we use in our 
researches. We emphasize its interdisciplinary feature since 
it involves moral and political philosophy, history of 
economic thought, economic theory and modern analytical 
tools. Second, we suggest two examples of works, finished 
or current, which are based on our methodology.  
1. Introduction 
Many leading economists are concerned about the future of the history of 
economic thought. Even though all recognize the importance of this discipline, 
they express pessimistic predictions concerning its future. Indeed these views 
reflect a strong reality in the academic world as the decreasing opportunities to 
pursue graduate studies in economic history clearly show it. In spite of the fact 
that economic sciences do not let much room for history of economic thought 
anymore, many young scholars choose to pursue a career in this field. Is there a 
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future for them? Is history of economic thought a useless, old-fashioned 
discipline with no interest for current economic developments? 
If we follow up the assumption that an observation and an understanding of 
the past are necessary for current economic theory, history of economic thought 
is indispensable in order to elaborate solutions to modern economic issues. 
That is how we envisage the future of history of economic thought as a 
powerful process of interdisciplinary analysis. 
An overview of the “methodology” we use in our research should show how 
history of economic thought can contribute to provide relevant answers to 
current economic issues, by linking history of economic thought and current 
economic theory. Our methodology stresses two main features to that end: first, 
one has to articulate as rigorously as possible the positive and the normative 
economics; second, one has to prove the relevance of our results thanks to 
modern analytical tools.  
Our paper is organized as follows: a second section outlines our 
methodology. Two examples of studies which are based on it are given in a 
third section. A fourth section concludes. 
2. Describing the suggested methodology 
Our methodology consists in carrying out analytical and applied developments 
closely related to historical and conceptual analysis. Our assumption is that our 
methodology is relevant for any modern economic issue and could be applied 
in order to propose new perspectives and solutions to deal with it. To be more 
specific, for any concept with whom economists deal, one must go through 
three stages: in the first place, the concept must be defined very precisely 
thanks to history of economic thought; in other words, the concept is examined 
in reference to the works of different authors. Hence, the first step of our 
methodology is devoted to a thorough analysis of the founding texts of this 
given concept in order to determine the value judgments it provoked. Secondly, 
the concept is applied to one or many fields of economic theory in order to 
analyze concrete problems it raises and to attempt to suggest new solutions for 
them. Indeed the second step of our methodology endeavors to propose 
solutions to a given set of problems, which the economic theory faces in 
different fields. The objective of this part is to articulate as rigorously as 
possible the positive and the normative analysis in order to show that the 
positive solutions proposed for a paradox or a problem are necessarily 
dependent on the value judgments, which govern the selected conceptual 
apparatus. And in our third stage, we test the proposed solutions resorting to 
contemporary economic instruments: for instance, applied econometrics or 
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experimental economics. This last step enables us to check the validity of our 
process and, in particular, the relevance of the solutions we designed.  
It must be noted that our methodology is connected to these applied in 
modern theories of justice. According to Fleurbaey (1996), a theory of justice – 
which combines philosophical and economic theories – is developed in three 
stages: 1) the selection of a philosophical theory of justice which advocates 
some moral values; 2) one or many axioms can thus be stemmed from them: 
this second step corresponds to an interpretative work for which one has to 
obtain a conformity between the moral values and the elaborated axioms; 3) in 
the third step which pertains to logical analysis, one has to examine the 
compatibility of the axioms. As regards our methodology the second step – 
applying a concept to one or many fields of economic theory – is similar to the 
second and third stages of Fleurbaey’s. But our first step is different from his. 
For our part, we apply at the chosen concept in economic theory the methods 
used in history of economic thought, i.e., the comparative review of literature 
and text analysis. And our methodology introduces a third dimension: to test 
the relevance of the solutions we obtained so as to establish their pertinence.  
Thus, our methodology is interdisciplinary by nature since it involves moral 
and political philosophy, history of economic thought, modern economic 
analysis and aims to contribute to current developments of economic analysis.  
The first main characteristic of our methodology consists in combining a 
conceptual reflection, which resorts to the developments of economic thought, 
and an analytical process applying modern tools of economic theory. 
Therefore, the fundamental elements which reveal the real structure of the 
concept we cope with are stressed: the value and fact judgments it implies and 
the combination of normative and positive economics. We consider that it is 
necessary to link explicitly a moral value to its analytical treatment. One must 
overcome the classical distinction between normative and positive economics 
elaborated by Keynes (1890) and attempt to combine normative and positive 
judgments. This is strongly emphasized as well by Roemer (1996, 1998), Sen 
(1999) or Maniquet (1999).  
The second main characteristic of our methodology consists in testing the 
results brought out by the theoretical framework we have used by the means of 
experimental economics and cliometrics. This analysis takes place in the third 
stage of our methodology which aims at examining the results’ relevancy by 
appreciating the conclusions’ validity.  
Let us focus here on the use of cliometrics as a process of empirical 
validation. Cliometrics, that is quantitative economic history, relies on 
historical econometrics of time series analysis so as to, in the last instance, 
establish causality relationships between economic variables (Diebolt (2005), 
Diebolt, Jaoul and San Martino (2005)). Thus, cliometric analysis is undertaken 
in order to demonstrate if empirical results corroborate the theoretical results 
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we previously proposed. We note that, when empirical validation relies on 
cliometrics, the historical analysis plays a predominant part in the whole 
analytical process since it involves history of economic thought and 
quantitative economic history. 
3. How to apply our methodology? Two examples 
We develop two examples of studies – finished or current –, which are based 
on our methodology in order to illustrate our discussion. The first study 
attempts to define and to apply a concept of freedom, whereas the second one 
deals with education.  
3.1. Defining and applying a concept of freedom 
We first propose an example of the methodology we advocate, by putting 
forward the study of Igersheim (2004), which attempts to bring an answer to 
the following questions: which concept of freedom should be used in a theory 
of distributive justice or, more simply, when a redistribution policy is decided? 
How, in the particular context of social choice theory, public actions should be 
determined in order to respect, to protect and to guarantee to the members of a 
society this concept of freedom? Thus, this study pursues two goals: first, to 
define an operational and synthetic concept of freedom by examining theories 
defended by different authors. Second, it applies this concept to a particular 
context: social choice theory.  
Thus, in a first part, elaborating upon the distinction of Constant (1819) 
between freedom of the ancients and freedom of the moderns, we show that 
this opposition should be overcome (aufgehoben): the necessity to overcome 
this opposition is strongly underlined by Rawls (1971, 1993, 2001) after Hegel 
(1821). We then argue that the notion of reconciliation between freedom of the 
ancients and freedom of the moderns is able in our concept of freedom to 
reflect the pair freedom of the ancients / freedom of the moderns. But modern 
bourgeois and ancient citizen cannot be perfect synonyms. The modern 
individual should try to reconcile these two notions and develop his 
subjectivity: reconciliation becomes a permanent quest. Therefore, in Hegel 
and Rawls, “modern” freedom is treated at a high level of abstraction and takes 
place only in a dimension called ancients / moderns.  
We then explore the concrete meaning of “modern” freedom by examining 
the possibility conditions of the reconciliation. In Rawlsian theory some 
drawbacks appear: indeed, even if Rawls integrates the economic dimension 
and mentions formal and real freedoms with his difference principle, the latter 
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remains his major argument. The economic dimension is in fact underestimated 
in justice as fairness. Moreover the problem of the repartition of physical and 
intellectual capacities and of the entailed inequalities is explicitly postponed by 
Rawls. In order to progress in defining the effectivity conditions of freedom 
another pair of freedoms apt to deal with the economic dimension and that of 
“talents / handicaps” is considered: the pair negative freedom / positive 
freedom. We examine Sen’s contribution on this issue and the evolution of 
Sen’s thought until the “capability approach” (1985, 1992). Sen stresses the 
necessity to define an objective measure of well-being which takes into account 
human diversity in economic and “talents / handicaps” dimensions. But one has 
to consider individual responsibility as well and Sen’s capability does not. Still 
the concept of capability which reflects the pair negative freedom / positive 
freedom is integrated in our synthetic concept of freedom. However it will be 
complete only by integrating the notion of individual responsibility.  
Individual responsibility, which is treated by Roemer who introduces 
original components such as the formalization of effort, is the third and last 
element of the concept of freedom. First, we study the Rawlsian treatment of 
responsibility, which is relatively crude: this notion is developed more subtly 
by his successors, particularly by Roemer (1996, 1998).  
Finally, the three components of our synthetic concept of freedom are 
reconciliation, capability and individual responsibility. This concept of freedom 
is then used in the second part of the study in order to find some possibility 
results to impossibility theorems elaborated in the social choice theoretical 
framework. In particular, Sen’s liberal paradox (1970a,b) is examined. The 
impossibility of a Paretian liberal is the first endeavor to introduce and analyze 
individual rights and freedoms in the social choice theoretical framework 
largely defined by Arrow (1951). For this reason the liberal paradox raises the 
question of a satisfying and implementable definition of individual rights in 
this framework.  
It is claimed that our concept of freedom is able to carry out this role. In 
order to integrate it into social choice theory, its three main elements are 
considered: first, the reconciliation between the ancients and the moderns, i.e., 
maintaining the tension between the State and individuals. But the second pair 
negative freedom / positive freedom, which is represented by the capability, 
cannot be considered as such: indeed, the economic dimension is not present 
into the social choice theoretical framework. In order to take it into account, we 
just consider the notion of protecting individual rights and freedoms, in other 
words, the necessity for society to guarantee individual rights. Finally, we 
consider individual responsibility. We thus invoke these three elements of our 
concept of freedom in order to elaborate some possibility results for Sen’s 
liberal paradox. We notably develop a Preference Modification Mechanism, 
which is based on them: it selects and launders individual preferences 
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consistent with the values of society. This mechanism is defined by two rules, 
which are justified by the operational concept of freedom, i.e., respect of 
individual rights.  
A third part could be added to this study as our methodology emphasized it: 
the Preference Modification Mechanism could be tested thanks to experimental 
economics, which aims at checking theoretical predictions against real 
individual choices. This third part would be in line with the studies concerning 
the individual cooperative behavior in public good games. They show that 
individuals, contrary to theoretical predictions, do not play Nash but 
overcontribute to public good (see, among others, Davis and Holt (1993) or 
Ledyard (1995) for a survey). As regards our Preference Modification 
Mechanism a repeated public good game could be elaborated in which 
participants could choose how to modify their initial preferences: either 
towards more individual freedoms or towards a renouncement of their 
individual sovereignty.  
3.2. Defining and applying a concept of education 
The methodology we support is experimented in a current study dealing with 
the relationships between justice, education and economic progress (Le  
Chapelain, 2006). Regarding our work, the problem is the following: how 
could a fair education system influence the economic development and what 
could we learn from it as far as public policy is concerned? Our work has three 
objectives so as to answer that question: defining a concept of justice for the 
education system relying on historical texts analysis, applying the highlighted 
concept through a theoretical model and validating the conclusions thanks to 
cliometrics. 
In order to distinguish precisely what we mean by a fair educative system, 
the first part relies on the history of economic thought itself based on texts 
analysis. Our study brings out the comparison of Condorcet’s writings (1791) 
about public instruction with Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971). Relying on both 
– a wish for fairness and a concern for elitism together with a demand for 
fairness and efficiency –, we demonstrate that Condorcet’s and Rawls’ views 
may be linked through the theme of talent. It is indeed thanks to equal chances 
offered to individuals that one may contemplate elitism and equality at the 
same time. Thus, on the basis of our analysis, we can specify our concept of 
justice as the equal opportunity for all individuals to develop their natural 
talents. We can also stress from our study some other complementary 
orientations. We can notice that Condorcet’s thought advocates the use of 
methods, which are called today affirmative action methods. It is interesting to 
see that such currently debated ideas, which concern the concept of equal 
opportunity in the education system, were already mentioned and even, as in 
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Condorcet’s case, defended in previous texts. Therefore we can ask ourselves 
what are the best means to favor the concept of justice we support. 
After having defined our concept of justice, a second part of our work 
consists in applying this concept to the formalized framework of a theoretical 
model. But the analysis of relationships between human capital and economic 
evolution generally takes place in endogenous growth models. Hence our study 
is carried on in this framework. However we emphasize that the originality of 
our work is based on the contribution of the concept of justice in the analysis of 
the connection between education and growth. The attempt to formalize an 
operational concept of justice can thus be appreciated.  
In the last instance, results brought out are submitted to an empirical 
validation relying on cliometric analysis. Indeed, by using current quantitative 
methods in the study of historical evolutions, we attempt to determine if the 
experience attests the validity of causal relationships between growth, 
education and equity. It is particularly interesting to notice that in the process 
of empirical validation based on cliometric analysis the appeal to historical 
analysis becomes prevailing in the methodology we use. Two steps of our 
analytical methodology are based on historical sources (whether they deal with 
history of economic thought or quantitative economic history) to solve a 
problem as important as that of the education system’s equity. Some may 
consider it as a paradox. But, on the contrary, we think that the convincing 
results of our methodology show the lack of clear-sightedness of those who see 
no point in resorting to an analysis based on economic history. 
4. Conclusion 
Thus, our methodology with its three stages – definition of a concept, 
application, empirical validation – resorts to many current economic tools and 
links strongly history of economic thought with contemporaneous research in 
economic theory.  
History of economic thought should be seen in this perspective: by including 
an historic questioning, relying on text analysis and quantitative methods, as a 
part and parcel of a multidisciplinary analytical process, which is meant to 
answer a given issue. 
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